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Abstract
This study investigates if and how the influence of compensation interdependence on 
risk-taking depends on mutual monitoring of risky investment decisions. We argue 
that individuals under compensation interdependence have a behavioral incentive 
for higher risk-taking if mutual monitoring is present. Impression management is 
hypothesized to be the driving force behind this effect, with the visibility of actions 
to the peers through mutual monitoring as an important prerequisite. The results 
of a laboratory experiment support our predictions. Additional analyses reveal that 
impression management drives our results because participants incorporate their 
peers’ preferences in their decision process. This reasoning is further substanti-
ated as individuals increase their risk-taking if they took less risk than their peers 
in previous experimental rounds and thus adjust to their respective peer group. Our 
findings inform firms about the effect of compensation interdependence in working 
environments with differing opportunities for mutual monitoring.
Keywords Risk-taking · Compensation interdependence · Mutual monitoring · 
Impression management · Social reasoning
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1 Introduction
Designing incentive systems that promote organizationally desirable behavior is an 
essential aspect of management accounting (Luft and Shields 2009). To promote 
team-oriented behavior and emphasize the importance of collaboration within a 
firm, tying incentives to group performance instead of individual performance has 
evermore gained firms’ interest (Merriman 2008). This is not surprising, as prior 
research has shown positive effects of such compensation interdependence, as it pro-
motes, for example, performance in collaborative working environments (Blasi et al. 
2010) as well as cooperation and coordination (FitzRoy and Kraft 1987).
However, prior research also suggests that compensation interdependence might 
influence other aspects of employee behavior. One important aspect that might 
influence achieving organizational goals is risk-taking. Hence, when firms consider 
implementing compensation interdependence, they should also consider the influ-
ence on risk-taking, as dysfunctional effects may arise, for example, risk-taking that 
might be excessive from a firm’s perspective (Lahno and Serra-Garcia 2015).
As compensation interdependence is defined as compensation being dependent 
on a group’s performance instead of individual performance (Nalbantian and Schot-
ter 1997), it is a specific form of decision-making in groups. Prior research on deci-
sion-making in groups demonstrates the existence of risky (cautious) shifts if deci-
sions are made in groups instead of individually; this is more generally referred to as 
“choice shifts”  (Davis 1992). Contrary to these typical group settings, many daily 
business decisions are made on an individual basis and, at the same time, influence 
other employees or departments of a firm. Examples are salespeople or key-account 
managers who decide which customers to approach in which specific way and whose 
compensation is interrelated, for example, through incentives based on divisional or 
firm performance. Hence, compensation interdependence and decision-making in 
groups do not necessarily go hand in hand (Bushman et al. 1995; Keating 1997). We 
aim at contributing to prior research by analyzing this highly relevant aspect.
As employee compensation systems do not operate in isolation, research needs 
to assess whether the impact of such management control systems, i.e., compensa-
tion interdependence, differs depending on the environment they are operating in. 
An aspect of growing relevance is alternative working environments such as digi-
tal workplaces outside the conventional office setup, e.g., telecommuting and work-
spaces without fixed workplaces (hot-desking), which are continually spreading 
(Global Workplace Analytics 2020). These alternative working environments have 
one aspect in common: reduced possibilities for interaction among employees and 
mutual monitoring. While they offer the potential to increase productivity and job 
satisfaction and reduce costs, a potential downside is less employee-employee inter-
action in telecommuting (Harris 2003; Hislop and Axtell 2007) and hot-desking set-
ups (Brown and O’Hara 2003; Hirst 2011). Hence, research needs to assess not only 
the direct influence of such differing possibilities for interaction among employees 
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but also how these possibilities affect the influence compensation systems have on 
employee behavior.
For this reason, we analyze whether the influence of compensation interdepend-
ence on risk-taking depends on mutual monitoring. While mutual monitoring, in 
general, refers to individuals’ ability to observe each other’s actions (Towry 2003), 
it refers specifically to the ability to observe each other’s decisions in terms of risk-
taking in our experimental setting.1 This setting is of particular importance, as com-
pensation systems are implemented for many employees, while alternative working 
environments often affect only parts of the employees.
Being monitored by others makes individuals think about the impression oth-
ers are forming of them (Leary and Kowalski 1990) and, consequently, adjust their 
behavior to create a positive impression (Bolino et al. 2008). However, which deci-
sions individuals believe to create a positive impression depend on organizational 
and situational circumstances. Under individual performance-based compensation, 
other-regarding preferences should not play a role, and the individual risk prefer-
ences are reinforced. As most individuals are considered risk-averse, risk-taking is 
reduced. However, individuals under compensation interdependence are not only 
responsible for themselves but also for other individuals. Hence, they try to adjust 
their decisions to the other individuals’ preferences to make a good impression on 
peers (impression management). Consequently, their decision depends on what they 
believe the others’ preferences to be.
If individuals under compensation interdependence perceive their investments as 
riskier than the peers’ investments, they are likely to reduce risk-taking to adjust 
to the group. If the opposite is true and risk-taking is lower in comparison, there 
is an incentive to adjust to the peer group and take additional risk. Hence, upward-
adjustments are only reasonable under compensation interdependence in the pres-
ence of mutual monitoring. As stated above, this impression-management process 
requires that peer decisions are observable, i.e., it hinges on mutual monitoring. In 
the absence of mutual monitoring, individuals have no information which would 
allow them to harmonize their decisions. Thus, we predict that compensation inter-
dependence leads to higher risk-taking if mutual monitoring is present. However, if 
mutual monitoring is absent, the motivation described above diminishes, as impres-
sion management is not possible under the absence of mutual monitoring.
To test our predictions, we conduct a laboratory experiment with 120 business 
students. We manipulate compensation interdependence (absent versus present) and 
mutual monitoring (absent versus present) between subjects. We use an investment 
task with ten rounds, where subjects have to decide in each round how to split an 
endowment between two risky investment alternatives, with one alternative being 
riskier than the other. Hence, this task measures “pure risk” instead of also adding 
1 Thus, unlike formal mutual monitoring models, which study a principal’s opportunity to exploit mutual 
monitoring among agents in a multi-agent setting (e. g. Ma 1988; Zhang 2008), our study focuses on 
non-contractible mutual monitoring between employees.
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an effort perspective.2 Importantly, choosing the riskier alternative goes together 
with foregoing expected value. As companies are typically assumed to maximize 
expected value, the riskier alternative would be considered suboptimal from the 
firm’s perspective. Also, we assume a linear relationship between the investment 
proceeds and the subjects’ compensation. This resembles the typical incentive zone 
in contracts with variable compensation.3
As predicted, we find that the effect of compensation interdependence on risk-
taking depends on mutual monitoring. In particular, compensation interdepend-
ence leads to higher risk-taking in the presence of mutual monitoring, but not in its 
absence.
Our findings contribute to both management accounting theory and practice. 
From a practical perspective, we inform firms that compensation interdependence 
is associated with higher risk-taking when mutual monitoring is present, but not 
when mutual monitoring is absent. Therefore, firms should consider if the working 
environment allows mutual monitoring when deciding about implementing an inter-
dependent compensation system to actively manage risk-taking, especially if risk-
taking can be suboptimal from a firm’s perspective.
From a theoretical perspective, we add to the stream of research investigating 
the existence of choice shifts in groups.4 However, in contrast to prior literature, 
we analyze a particular characteristic of decision-making common in practice: 
4 Previous research in this field has investigated whether and how group decision rules, e.g., unanim-
ity (e.g., Ambrus et al. 2015; Baker et al. 2008; Bougheas et al. 2013; Brunette et al. 2015; Keller et al. 
2007; Keck et al. 2014; Masclet et al. 2009; Nieboer 2015; Sheremeta and Zhang 2010; Shupp and Wil-
liams 2008; Zhang and Casari 2012), majority votes (e.g., Brunette et  al. 2015; Harrison et  al. 2013), 
and dictatorship procedures (e.g., Bolton et al. 2015; Ertac and Gurdal 2012) affect risk-taking of groups 
compared to risk-taking of the individual.
2 In practice, risk decisions can hardly be separated from effort decisions. E.g., Hakenes and Schna-
bel (2014) present a theoretical analysis that combines risk decisions and (costly) effort decisions, with 
both decisions being potentially interrelated. This paper chooses a behavioral approach and relies on 
the experimental research method. Combining risk and effort decisions is also possible in experimental 
research. However, for the ease of exposition we exclusively study risk-taking decisions. Moreover, com-
bining risk and effort decisions in the experiment would further impede the advantage of the experimen-
tal method, i.e., causal inference.
3 Many compensation contracts entail a variable bonus component with variable pay as a linear function 
of performance between a minimum level that does not warrant variable pay (floor) and a cap (Bennett 
et  al. 2017; Murphy 2001). While floors induce an incentive to take additional risk, caps are intended 
to induce a more prudential behavior (Murphy 2013; Asai 2016). This is why, for example, lawmakers 
in the U.S. and Europe introduced mandated caps in compensation contracts such as through the Trou-
bled Asset Relief Program (Garner and Kim 2010) or the Capital Requirement Directive IV (European 
Parliament and the Council 2013). We acknowledge that total compensation is frequently characterized 
by a convex curvature. Especially the limited liability due to a fixed baseline component without loss 
participation is assumed to drive risk-taking. Focusing on the incentive zone as a part of compensation 
contracts is a conservative test of our theory given the lack of these risk-inducing situational character-
istics. At the same time, subjects in the experiment receive a show-up fee that is not at risk. Further, an 
alternative design choice could have been to endow subjects with an amount that could be (partly or 
fully) invested while the amount not invested would be saved. The task by Gneezy and Potters (1997) 
that underlies our experiment adopts this idea by giving participants the opportunity to choose an alter-
native that safely pays the endowment or a lottery. However, we do not expect this design choice to inter-
act with our manipulations.
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compensation interdependence with individual decisions. Our results show that 
well-documented choice shifts in groups do not necessarily depend on interaction or 
particular decision rules in groups. They also occur in less salient forms of groups, 
where decision-making takes place on an individual basis under compensation 
interdependence.
We further substantiate that impression management concerns drive the effects 
of mutual monitoring. While Yechiam et  al. (2008) find that mutual observability 
of choices and outputs between two individuals increases risk-taking, impression 
management concerns are unlikely to be the driver of this effect as they investi-
gate groups of two without compensation interdependence. Lahno and Serra-Gar-
cia (2015) show that relative payoff concerns and a “norm to conform” influence 
an individual’s risk-taking behavior in groups of two. Other studies focus on the 
effects of social comparison on risk-taking based on the obtained payoffs and find 
significant effects on risk-taking (Bault et  al. 2008; Linde and Sonnemans 2012). 
Hence, prior literature on the subject does not include any research investigating set-
tings where impression management can play a role in influencing risk-taking within 
groups of more than two individuals. Therefore, our study contributes to existing 
research by examining such situations, which are widespread in practice, for exam-
ple, in the form of annual bonus payments based on firm performance or department 
performance (Lazear and Shaw 2007). Further, we are strict in only allowing moni-
toring decisions and not outcomes. This choice rules out alternative explanations 
like learning by trial and error (Schedlinsky et al. 2016) and provides an opportunity 
for a suitable test of our hypothesized effects.
2  Background and Development of Hypotheses
2.1  Background
2.1.1  Setting
In line with Lefebvre and Vieider (2013, 2014), we classify an investment H as risk-
ier if it offers a higher standard deviation (σH) and a lower expected value  (EVH) 
than another investment L  (EVH < EVL; σH > σL).5 This setting rests upon the idea 
of mean–variance analysis, which is frequently used to compare uncertain prospects 
(Rothschild and Stiglitz 1970). Under this approach, means of the alternatives are 
often held constant and the alternative with the lower variance is assumed prefera-
ble. However, under the expected utility maximization theory, this approach requires 
severe restrictions regarding the underlying distribution to be theoretically sound.6 
5 Given this simultaneity of standard deviation and expected value, it is hardly possible to disentangle 
the direction, i.e., if the investment returns or the standard deviation drive the effect.
6 Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) discuss the mean–variance analysis intensively and summarize that it 
can yield unjustified conclusions, i.e., that risk-averse individuals may prefer high-variance projects over 
low-variance projects depending on the underlying function, more precisely for any nonquadratic con-
cave function. In turn, mean–variance analysis is unproblematic for distributions that are identical apart 
from their location parameters, i.e., affine transformations.
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We assign the higher-variance alternative also the lower expected value to facilitate 
the identification of an organizationally desired result.7
Firms are typically characterized as risk-neutral and would hence always prefer 
the investment with the higher expected value and avoid risk-taking beyond the level 
needed to maximize expected value. This notion is in line with prior research (Lefeb-
vre and Vieider 2014). Under this frequent assumption, individuals choosing invest-
ment H on behalf of the firm would deviate from corporate objectives. We investi-
gate different incentive schemes, which firms introduce to direct employee behavior 
also in terms of risk-taking. Employees, though, may have objectives and prefer-
ences that diverge from those of the firm. As individuals are frequently assumed 
risk-averse, they could exhibit risk behavior that entails lower risk-taking than the 
firm’s risk-neutral expectations. However, individuals may also be risk-seeking by 
disposition or show situational risk-taking behavior, leading to higher risk than the 
firm expects (Sitkin and Weingart 1995). For example, individual decision-makers’ 
decisions, deviating from organizational objectives, policies, or guidelines, were 
assumed drivers of the financial crisis.
2.1.2  Compensation interdependence
Literature investigating the difference between risk-taking in groups and risk-taking 
by individuals shows mixed results as far as the existence and direction of a choice 
shift is concerned. While many studies identify a risky shift in groups,8 other studies 
discover a cautious shift,9 or no choice shift at all.10 Even when accounting for the 
different decision-making rules, for example, unanimity after discussion or majority 
votes, results remain ambiguous.
As noted in the introduction, we focus on compensation interdependence, as this 
is a more common feature in decision-making practice than actual group decisions. 
In line with Nalbantian and Schotter (1997) and Lill (2020), we define compensa-
tion interdependence as the degree to which the compensation depends on group-
based rather than individual-based outcomes. Compensation interdependence is 
beneficial for firms as it strengthens cooperation and coordination among employ-
ees (FitzRoy and Kraft 1987). However, research on compensation interdepend-
ence also finds that individual misreporting increases if another individual benefits 
as well (Church et al. 2012; Lill 2020). Further, Maas and van Rinsum (2013) find 
that individually beneficial misreporting is higher if another person is also affected 
positively compared to when another person is affected negatively. Di Cagno et al. 
(2012) find that compensation interdependence increases risk-taking in a two-person 
environment (without risk-taking to be suboptimally high from a firm perspective) 
7 We discuss the reason for not holding the expected values constant in more detail when introducing the 
experimental task.
8 For example, Bougheas et al. 2013; Brunette et al. 2015; Nieboer 2015; Sutter 2007; Zhang and Casari 
2012.
9 For example, Ambrus et al. 2015; Keller et al. 2007; Masclet et al. 2009; Sheremeta and Zhang 2010.
10 For example, Baker et al. 2008; Harrison et al. 2013; Keck et al. 2014.
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and that—when they have the choice—individuals choose team partners with simi-
lar risk preferences.
From all other decision-making rules, the dictatorship procedure has the most 
substantial similarity to our definition of compensation interdependence, even 
though it is less common in practice. The procedure is not a group-decision rule in a 
narrow sense, as only one person decides without coordinating the decision techni-
cally or personally. This procedure is related to compensation interdependence in the 
sense of not coordinating decisions, but not regarding the number of people making 
decisions that impact other people’s compensation. Research considering the dicta-
torship procedure finds that group risk-taking is higher than individual risk-taking 
if individuals take turns in deciding for a group of three, with each person deciding 
for three out of nine rounds (Sutter 2009). Contrarily, one individual dictating the 
decision, and thus the compensation for all group members, leads to a cautious shift 
compared to individual risk-taking (Bolton et al. 2015; Ertac and Gurdal 2012).
2.1.3  Mutual monitoring
Mutual monitoring refers to the ability of individuals to observe each other’s actions 
(Towry 2003). As we focus on risk-taking, mutual monitoring in this study’s con-
text consequently refers to the ability to observe each other’s decisions that involve 
risk-taking.
Mutual monitoring is ascribed mainly positive effects. Prior literature has shown 
that mutual monitoring increases the pressure to act following behavior principles 
in social groups and, therefore, can increase productivity (Mas and Moretti 2009). 
Hannan et al. (2013) find that mutual monitoring can positively and negatively influ-
ence effort when employees are compensated based on rank-order tournaments 
depending on the tendency to either compete or collude. Towry (2003) shows that 
mutual monitoring can be utilized in contract design to increase effort, while Chong 
and Khudzir (2018) show that mutual monitoring mitigates budgetary slack creation.
2.2  Hypotheses development
Economic theory provides ambiguous explanations for risk-taking behavior depend-
ing on the level of compensation interdependence. The individual claim is ceteris 
paribus less risky under compensation interdependence because of diversification 
effects, which may increase individual risk-taking. Simultaneously, being depend-
ent on others’ decisions (as a larger part of the compensation is out of one’s control) 
increases the level of external influences on compensation, which could motivate 
individuals towards taking less risk.
In this paper, we rely on impression management as a behavioral theory and pre-
dict that the influence of compensation interdependence on risk-taking depends on 
the presence of mutual monitoring, as impression management requires a working 
environment in which the decision-maker can observe peers’ risk-taking and knows 
that his or her risk-taking can be observed. Hence, individuals get an impression of 
the others’ preferences by their behavior and know that others form an impression 
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of them. Theories on impression management postulate that individuals care about 
how others see them and try to model others’ impressions towards various dimen-
sions (Jones and Pittman 1982; Goffman 1959). According to attribution sought, 
Jones and Pittman (1982) classify impression management strategies in five catego-
ries: ingratiation, intimidation, self-promotion, exemplification, and supplication. 
In this framework, opinion conformity is an important example of an ingratiation 
action conducted to manage the impression others form of a person. Notably, Jones 
and Pittman (1982) state that ingratiation is “shaped and constrained by moral or 
evaluative factors” (Jones and Pittman 1982, p. 237). This emphasizes the strong 
relation of actions within this strategy to conformity theories and  to (descriptive) 
norms. Such norms describe how individuals commonly behave in a particular situa-
tion, i.e., a “‘normal’ or ‘regular’ behavior” (Bicchieri 2006, p. 29). Notably, it does 
not need acknowledgment (group pressure or punishment) when (not) following the 
norm; instead, the motive to follow a descriptive norm is (as the reason for impres-
sion management) self-interested, because individuals want to belong to a system or 
“do things right”  (Bicchieri 2006). A descriptive norm can be to “do things right” 
in terms of risk-taking. What is considered as “right”, however, depends on compen-
sation interdependence.11
Individuals under individual compensation are solely responsible for themselves. 
Hence, other-regarding preferences should not play a role. This should reinforce that 
the “right” decision in this context is following the own risk  preferences. Conse-
quently, mutual monitoring enforces existing risk preferences in the absence of com-
pensation interdependence, which is (at least for the majority of individuals) risk 
aversion. Also, if such individuals opted for higher risk in past decisions, seeing 
their peers taking lower risk could motivate them to take fewer risks as well, as they 
see that their peers even share their risk preferences. However, if such individuals 
took less risk than their peers in the past, there is no descriptive norm for increasing 
risk-taking, as everyone is solely responsible for themselves. To sum up, individuals 
under mutual monitoring without compensation interdependence have no incentives 
to adjust their risk-taking upwards if they took less risky decisions than their peers 
did in the past.
However, under compensation interdependence, a “right decision” in terms of 
risk-taking incorporates affected peers’ preferences. Hence, a positive impres-
sion can be generated by opinion conformity to the average risk-taking of affected 
peers. Thus, individuals under compensation interdependence develop a desire 
to consider their peers’ preferences motivated by impression management. More 
precisely, if individuals under compensation interdependence realize that they 
11 Another important stream of literature explaining why individuals follow other individuals’ actions 
is the work on herding behavior (e.g., Bikhchandani et al. 1992; Banerjee 1992). A common notion in 
this literature is that people infer the private information of preceding individuals from their actions. As 
a result of this, individuals are likely to act in accordance with other people’s decisions, even against the 
actions suggested by own private information. In our setting, we emphasize that nobody can receive any 
signals regarding the “true” states of nature; hence, subjects are aware that private information cannot 
exist. Thus, our experiment is closer to the “conformity preference” that can exist next to herding behav-
ior (in a narrow sense) through informational cascades examined in Bikhchandani et al. (1992).
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opted for higher risk than their peers due to mutual monitoring, they have an 
incentive to lower risk-taking to adjust themselves to the affected group. However, 
if individuals chose below-average risk levels, they have an incentive to increase 
risk-taking to live up to the (presumed) group expectations. Hence, unlike under 
individual compensation, there is a (behavioral) incentive to adjust risk-taking in 
the upward direction under compensation interdependence, as the decisions affect 
peers’ compensation. Hence, following the descriptive norm regarding the aver-
age level of risk-taking can generate a positive impression.
To sum up, we argue that compensation interdependence only has an impact 
in a situation with mutual monitoring, and hence predict an interaction effect. 
When mutual monitoring is present, reasons to adjust risk-taking upwards under 
compensation interdependence lead to higher risk-taking. This is formally stated 
in our hypotheses:
H1: The influence of compensation interdependence on risk-taking depends on 
the existence of mutual monitoring.
H2: Under the presence of mutual monitoring, risk-taking is higher if compen-
sation interdependence is present rather than absent.
3  Experimental method
3.1  Experimental manipulations
To test our predictions, we employ a laboratory 2 × 2 × 10 mixed design experi-
ment conducted in z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). We manipulate the two factors 
compensation interdependence (absent versus present) and mutual monitoring 
(absent versus present) between subjects. The experiment consists of 10 rounds; 
hence, time is our third factor manipulated within subjects.
When compensation interdependence is present, participants’ compensation 
for the main part of the experiment is the sum of five peers’ financial returns 
sitting in a row equally divided between the peers. When compensation interde-
pendence is absent, participants’ compensation for the main part of the experi-
ment is calculated based on the financial returns resulting from each participant’s 
individual investment decisions. Most importantly, we neither refer to partici-
pants as “group members” nor use the term “group” at any time in the experiment 
to allow for a robust test of the concept of compensation interdependence instead 
of decision-making in groups.
When mutual monitoring is present, participants receive information about their 
own investment decision in the previous round and the four other participants’ 
investment decisions sitting in the same row. In the absence of mutual monitor-
ing, the only information participants receive about the previous round is their own 
investment decision. Importantly, participants in both conditions do not receive any 
further information, especially no information about investment decisions’ out-
comes. This is necessary to prevent former outcomes from influencing the partici-
pants, as documented in prior literature (Bault et al. 2008).
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3.2  Experimental task
We employ a modified version of the investment task by Gneezy and Potters (1997), and 
each round, ask participants to decide how to split an endowment of 1000 Lira into two 
possible investment alternatives, “A” and “B”.12 In each round, one investment alternative 
(for the purpose of this paper called “L”) offers a lower standard deviation and a higher 
payout in the low-paying state of nature than the other investment alternative (for the pur-
pose of this paper called “H”). Investment alternative L offers an expected value of 100% 
of the invested amount. In contrast, investment alternative H offers an expected value of 
83.33% of the invested amount.13 Notably, alternative L also contains some risk. Hence, 
participants with the desire to take some risk are not forced to invest in H. Consequently, 
we use the amount invested in alternative H as our measure for higher risk-taking.
Figure 1 depicts the investment task structure: the amount invested is multiplied by 
the factor related to the investment alternative and the realized state of nature. If state of 
nature 1 is realized in the example, the amount invested in alternative A is multiplied by 
122%, and the amount invested in alternative B by 162%. The sum of the returns of both 
investment alternatives represents the return of the overall investment decision. The out-
comes of both investment alternatives in one round are determined by the same lottery, 
either resulting in a high-paying state of nature (state of nature 1) or a low-paying state 
of nature (state of nature 2) for both investment alternatives. The probabilities for the 
possible states of nature and the investment alternatives’ multipliers vary across rounds 
to avoid boredom and habituated behavior.14 Even though probabilities and return mul-
tipliers are identical for all participants in the same round, we use independent lotteries 
for all participants and rounds; hence, each realized state of nature is independent of the 
realized state of nature of any other participant and round. Participants do not learn about 
the outcomes of their investment decisions before the end of the experiment to rule out 
reactions to former outcomes as an alternative explanation for our results.
3.3  Participants and procedure
In total, 120 business students participated in the study, and they were randomly 
assigned to one of the four treatment conditions. Nine participants were excluded 
from the analysis as they did provide unclear ex-ante risk preferences; hence, the 
analysis is based on 111 participants.15 The average age is 22.2 years, with 55.9% 
12 Lira is the experimental currency used. The exchange rate for the experimental currency is 65 Lira/€. 
Participants had to split their entire endowment of 1,000 Lira into the two investment alternatives in each 
round; hence, there was no possibility to carry over parts of the endowment in a subsequent round. The 
labels “A” and “B” have been determined randomly for each round to avoid any influence of the labels on 
participants’ decisions.
13 Notably, the expected value of H is smaller than one to represent negative expected returns.
14 An overview about all multipliers and probabilities for the states of nature is depicted in Table  4 
in Appendix 1.
15 The nine participants excluded failed to provide consistent risk preference choices in the risk prefer-
ence elicitation instrument introduced in this section. This consistency would be characterized by at most 
one switching point between the participation in the lottery and the safe payment. Including the nine par-
ticipants using a fourth risk preference label for these participants did result in inferential identical results 
in our analyses for the hypotheses test (cf. footnote 21).
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(44.1%) being male (female). On average, the number of math and statistics classes 
taken is 3.24. There are no significant differences across conditions for age (p = 0.91, 
two-tailed), gender (p = 0.84, two-tailed), course of study (p = 0.84, two-tailed), 
semester (p = 0.82, two-tailed), prior experience with laboratory experiments 
(p = 0.31, two-tailed) and number of math and statistics classes taken (p = 0.48, two-
tailed). Thus, randomization was successful.
Upon arrival in the laboratory, participants were seated in rows of five, and they 
introduced themselves by announcing their row and their participant number.16 After 
that, the participants had 13 min to read the written instructions. To ensure a suffi-
cient understanding of the critical information and the experimental procedure, par-
ticipants had to answer all questions of a quiz correctly before proceeding.
To measure the participants’ ex-ante risk preferences before the investment 
task began, we employed a commonly used risk preference elicitation instrument 
(e.g., Sprinkle et al. 2008). For 15 different lotteries, the participants had to choose 
between a safe payment and participation in a lottery. The safe payment was 100 
Lira for all choices, while the lotteries paid either 200 Lira with a probability of π 
or 0 Lira with a probability of 1 − π. Probability π decreases from 85% (lottery 1) to 
15% (lottery 15) in increments of 5%.17 The participants were informed that one of 
the 15 options would be selected at random and that the respective payment would 
be part of the final compensation. However, they did learn neither about the drawn 
option nor about the realized state of the respective lottery before the end of the 
investment task to avoid wealth effects as well as an influence of the lottery outcome 
on decision-making in the investment task.18 70 (34, 7) subjects are risk-averse (risk-
neutral, risk-seeking). There are no significant differences across conditions for ex-
ante risk preferences (p = 0.98, two-tailed).
The main part of the experiment started with the first round of the investment 
task.19 After each of the ten rounds, participants received feedback following their 
experimental condition. All participants within a session started each round at the 
same time.
After performing the investment task, participants were informed about the ran-
domly drawn lottery outcome from the risk preference elicitation instrument. Fur-
ther, one round of the main task was randomly drawn in front of the participants 
to determine their compensation for this part of the experiment. Overall, all par-
ticipants received a fixed compensation for participation, a variable payment for 
16 Participants had to introduce themselves by standing up one by one and saying “I am participant num-
ber one/two/three/four/five in row number one/two/three.” In the mutual monitoring condition, this pro-
cedure shall allow a connection of the investment decisions of participants in one row. To hold this fea-
ture constant across conditions, the introduction took place in all treatments.
17 Based on subjects’ decisions in the risk preference elicitation, they are labeled risk-averse (risk-neu-
tral, risk-seeking) if they require a minimum of a 60% (50%, 15%) chance of winning to choose a lottery 
over a safe payment.
18 Participants were also informed that the risk preference elicitation task was independent from the rest 
of the experiment.
19 All participants had the possibility to use paper and pens as well as a calculator on their computers. 
Moreover, all participants were required to wear earmuffs since mouse or keyboard sounds may reveal 
the time other participants spend on calculations, and thus influence behavior.
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the lottery, and their variable compensation from a randomly drawn round for the 
main experiment in accordance with the respective treatment (compensation inter-
dependence absent or present). Participants earned an average of € 17.56. After the 
drawings, the participants had to answer a post-experimental questionnaire and were 
dismissed.
4  Results
4.1  Descriptive statistics
Table 1 shows descriptive data for our main dependent variable risk-taking, i.e., the 
amount invested in the investment alternative with higher risk (H) for each round 
and treatment (Panel A), and aggregated results of all rounds (Panel B).
On average, participants spent 2496.31 of a maximum of 10,000 Lira over all 
ten rounds on investments in alternative H (Panel B). When comparing the treat-
ment effects, compensation interdependence (unconditionally) increases investments 
in H and hence, risk-taking, by 15.2% (presence 2677.74 vs. absence 2324.42). The 
presence of mutual monitoring decreases risk-taking by 9.4% (presence 2372.40 vs. 
absence 2618.00). Comparing the four cells individually gives rise to the hypoth-
esized interaction effect. In the absence of mutual monitoring, the presence of com-
pensation interdependence reduces risk-taking slightly by 13.8% (presence 2417.41 
vs. absence 2804.76). In contrast, if mutual monitoring is present, introducing 
compensation interdependence magnifies risk-taking by 60.8% (presence 2938.07 
vs. absence 1826.93). The data are in line with H1 to the extent that the effect of 
compensation interdependence on risk-taking hinges on the presence or absence of 
mutual monitoring. Further, the cell means are in line with H2 to the extent that 
compensation interdependence increases risk-taking in settings with mutual moni-
toring, but not in the absence of mutual monitoring.
4.2  Hypotheses test
H1 predicts that the effect of compensation interdependence depends on the exist-
ence of mutual monitoring. To formally test this hypothesis, we conduct a repeated-
measures analysis of variance (RM-ANOVA) with risk-taking, i.e., the investment in 
the alternative H containing higher risk, as our dependent variable. Compensation 
interdependence, mutual monitoring, and round are our independent variables. Ex-
ante risk preferences are included to rule out that subjects’ risk  preferences drive 
the results. As presented in Table 2, Panel A, we find a significant interaction effect 
for the influence of compensation interdependence and mutual monitoring (F = 7.37, 
p < 0.01, two-tailed). Hence, H1 is supported. Moreover, we do neither find a signifi-
cant main effect of compensation interdependence (F = 1.51, p = 0.222, two-tailed) 
nor a significant main effect of mutual monitoring (F = 0.76, p = 0.386, two-tailed).20
20 We also find a significant main effect of our variable round, which indicates a linear trend over the 
course of the experiment as well as a significant interaction effect of our variables round and mutual 
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H2 predicts that risk-taking under mutual monitoring is higher if compensation 
interdependence is present rather than absent. As H2 focuses on the effect of com-
pensation interdependence under different conditions of mutual monitoring, we fol-
low up on our analysis with simple effect tests based on the previous ANOVA results 
to test for the effect of compensation interdependence when mutual monitoring is 
present versus absent. Again, the ex-ante risk preference is included to rule out that 
risk  preferences drive the results. As presented in Table  2, Panel B, we find that 
under mutual monitoring, participants with compensation interdependence invest 
more into the alternative that contains higher risk than participants without compen-
sation interdependence (F = 7.71, p < 0.01, two-tailed). We also find that compensa-
tion interdependence does not affect risk-taking in the absence of mutual monitoring 
(F = 1.12, p = 0.293, two-tailed). For this reason, we conclude that mutual monitor-
ing indeed moderates the effect of compensation interdependence on risk-taking and 
that compensation interdependence significantly increases risk-taking only under 
mutual monitoring.21 Consequently, H2 is supported as well.
4.3  Additional analysis
This section ties the results to the proposed psychological mechanisms. The rea-
soning for H2 proposes that under mutual monitoring, individuals take higher risks 
when compensation interdependence is present instead of absent, as—based on 
impression management—they have a reason to increase their investment into higher 
risks, and thus possibly tend to carry out “upward changes” from one round to the 
other. If this holds, individuals under compensation interdependence should be far 
more concerned about being perceived as reasonable decision-makers (impres-
sion). In addition to this, they should think much more often about others’ decisions 
(thoughts) and have a greater desire to consider (consideration) their peers’ prefer-
ences. Finally, they should aim at incorporating these preferences in their own deci-
sions (incorporation).
Table  3 reveals answers from the post-experimental questionnaire. Participants 
under mutual monitoring are significantly more concerned about being perceived 
as reasonable decision-makers if compensation interdependence is present rather 
than absent (impression, 4.37 vs. 2.68, p < 0.01, two-tailed). They think significantly 
more often about others’ decisions (thoughts, 3.78 vs. 2.86, p = 0.064, two-tailed), 
and they have a greater desire to consider their peers’ preferences (considera-
tion, 3.33 vs. 2.43, p = 0.058, two-tailed). Further, they aim at incorporating these 
21 The results of the analyses remain inferentially identical when we include the nine participants that 
have not been included in the analysis as they failed to provide consistent risk preference choices. In this 
case, we use “unclear risk preferences” as a fourth risk preference label for these participants (in addition 
to risk-averse, risk-neutral, and risk-seeking) in a robustness check for the hypotheses tests.
Footnote 20 (continued)
monitoring. However, as our task is designed in a way that gives participants different investment oppor-
tunities every round, we cannot rule out that these effects are driven by participants having a (subjective) 
preference or aversion for a specific investment opportunity. Hence, we refrain from interpreting these 
effects for conservativeness reasons.
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preferences into their own decisions more strongly (incorporation, 3.33 vs. 2.32, 
p = 0.047, two-tailed). These findings support our theoretical reasoning regarding 
the intentions of individuals.
Our argumentation further relies on the assumption that individuals change their 
behavior if they receive information under mutual monitoring. Hence, we analyze 
how participants under mutual monitoring change their investment decision from 
one round to another. As stated in the hypothesis development, individuals on aver-
age have—irrespective of compensation interdependence—personal motives to take 
less risks, that is, avoiding risks to raise the expected value of payoffs. However, 
only individuals under compensation interdependence have an impression-manage-
ment-based reasoning to increase their risk-taking: they wish to harmonize their 
own decisions and their peers’ decisions, provided they took less risk in the previous 
round than their peers. To test this prediction, we investigate the effect of compensa-
tion interdependence on risk-taking for subjects in the mutual-monitoring condition 
that took less than average risk in previous rounds. Therefore, we pool observations 
and run an ANOVA with the change in risk-taking from one round to another being 
the dependent variable. As independent variables, we include mutual monitoring, 
compensation interdependence, and the latter two’s interaction. Further, we create 
a dummy that takes the value of 1 (0) if individuals took less or equal (more) risk 
than the average of peers’ risk-taking in the previous round. This dummy also inter-
acts with the two (original) independent variables and their interaction. We are only 
interested in the 55 subjects under mutual monitoring from rounds two to ten, as 
mutual monitoring is first present after round one (n = 495).
In the overall sample, risk-taking below or equal to the average value occurred 
282 times, and above-average risk-taking 213 times. A post-hoc contrast for com-
pensation interdependence under the mutual monitoring and below-or-equal-to-
average conditions reveals that participants increased their risk-taking significantly 
stronger under compensation interdependence (79.99 vs. 29.63, F = 4.71, p = 0.030, 
two-tailed).22 Further, we do not find a difference in adjustments under the same 
conditions if individuals took more risk than their peers did on average in the previ-
ous round, with both averages showing downward adjustments, as expected in this 
case (− 108.78 vs. − 77.28, F = 1.39, p = 0.238, two-tailed).23 These findings sup-
port our prediction that the difference is driven by upward adjustments under mutual 
monitoring and compensation interdependence.
To further validate this result, we investigate if compensation interdependence 
makes a difference regarding risk-taking in the first round in mutual monitoring con-
ditions. No difference in risk-taking between individuals with compensation inter-
dependence and individuals without compensation interdependence under mutual 
monitoring is observed in the first round (p = 0.453, two-tailed). This highlights the 
22 These results are robust for a split of lower (n = 258) versus higher or equal (n = 237) risk compared to 
the peers’ average in the previous round, with averages of 91.44 (34.40) for compensation interdepend-
ence present (absent) (F = 5.57, p = 0.019, two-tailed).
23 Again, the results are robust for a configuration of lower versus higher or equal risk compared to the 
peers’ average in the previous round (-104.85 vs. -70.02, F = 1.91, p = 0.167, two-tailed).
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importance of the informational value mutual monitoring has for participants in our 
setting.
5  Conclusion
Compensation systems in practice often include aspects of compensation interde-
pendence between employees for various reasons, such as an instrument to elicit 
effort and performance or increase team cohesion. We investigate whether compen-
sation interdependence, besides its positive aspects, also involves hidden costs of 
higher risk-taking. Importantly, risk-taking is not necessarily a problem per se, as 
taking risks is essential to exploit entrepreneurial opportunities (Kreilkamp et  al. 
2020). Thus, as employees are frequently risk-averse, motivating them to take more 
risks is often necessary. However, we investigate a situation in which risk-taking is 
suboptimal from the firm’s perspective in that additional units of risk go together 
with lower expected values. Thus, firms must carefully trade-off the benefits of 
Table 2  Hypothesis test
a All p-values are reported on a two-tailed basis
b p-values within subjects are calculated based on the Huynh–Feldt correction to account for sphericity
c Panel B reports contrast testing following a pooled ANOVA containing the between-subjects factors 
CI, mutual monitoring, and CI × mutual monitoring. Ex-ante risk preferences are included in the pooled 
ANOVA to rule out that subjects’ risk preferences drive the results
Panel A: Repeated measures ANOVA results (n = 111)
Dependent variable = high risk-taking per round through rounds 1–10
Source Df Type 3 SS F-value p-valuea, b
Between subjects
 CI (absent, present) 1 338,148.89 1.51 0.222
 Mutual monitoring (absent, present) 1 169,860.40 0.76 0.386
 CI × mutual monitoring 1 1,654,173.60 7.37 0.008***
 Risk preference 2 236,428.55 1.05 0.352
Within subjects
 Round 9 78,940.29 3.36 0.001***
 Round × CI 9 15,876.76 0.68 0.703
 Round × mutual monitoring 9 40,937.87 1.74 0.091*
 Round × CI × mutual monitoring 9 37,311.35 1.59 0.131
 Round × risk preference 18 17,346.32 0.74 0.746
Panel B: Simple effects tests for CI (contrasts following pooled ANOVA)c
Dependent variable = high risk-taking through rounds 1–10
Source Df Mean difference F-value p-valuea
CI under mutual monitoring present 1 1,111.14 7.71 0.007 ***
CI under mutual monitoring absent 1 − 387.35 1.12 0.293
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compensation interdependence against the hidden costs of higher risk-taking beyond 
the expected value-maximizing risk-neutral decision.
We analyze if the risk-inducing effect of compensation interdependence on 
risk-taking depends on an important aspect of the working environment: tradi-
tional workplaces or modern workplaces like telecommuting or hot-desking—
with the ability (not) to mutually monitor peers’ behavior as the key distinctive 
feature. To rule out alternative explanations, we focus on a major difference 
between these working environments: employees may observe each other in terms 
of mutual monitoring of risky decision-making.
In a laboratory experiment in which participants decide how to split an endow-
ment between two investment alternatives, we find that the effect of compensation 
interdependence depends on mutual monitoring. Specifically, under mutual mon-
itoring, risk-taking is higher if compensation interdependence is present rather 
than absent. We demonstrate that impression management is the driving force of 
this effect. We further show that individuals under compensation interdependence 
use “upward adjustments” more strongly to respond to their peer group’s average 
decision in the previous rounds. Our results also show no difference in risk-taking 
Table 3  Additional analysis
a This table reports the mean values for answers in the post-experimental questionnaire for the conditions 
in which mutual monitoring is present, separately for conditions with compensation interdependence 
absent and present. The means are tested for differences using an ANOVA, with F-values and p-values 
reported in the table
b All p-values are two-tailed
c Impression management concerns reports to what extent participants agree with the following state-
ment: “I wanted to be perceived as reasonable by other participants.”, based on a 7-point Likert scale 
(1-do not agree at all, 7-completely agree)
d Thoughts about decisions of other participants reports the answer to the question “How often did you 
think about the other participants’ decisions during the experiment?” based on a 7-point Likert scale 
(1-never, 7-very often)
e Importance to consider what other participants likely regard as the correct decision reports to what 
extent participants agree with the following statement: “It was important to me to consider what other 
participants likely regard as the correct decision.”, based on a 7-point Likert scale (1-do not agree at all, 
7-completely agree)
f Incorporation of other participants’ preferences reports to what extent participants agree with the fol-
lowing statement: “When making my decision I incorporated what other participants likely regarded as 
the correct decision.”, based on a 7-point Likert scale (1-do not agree at all, 7-completely agree)
Responses to post-experimental questions (mutual monitoring present, n = 55)a




Impression management  concernsc 2.68 4.37 10.30 < 0.01***
Thoughts about the decisions of other  participantsd 2.86 3.78 3.59 0.064*
Importance to consider what other participants 
likely regard as the correct  decisione
2.43 3.33 3.75 0.058*
Incorporation of other participants’  preferencesf 2.32 3.33 4.14 0.047**
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depending on compensation interdependence when mutual monitoring is absent. 
We attribute this to the absence of an impression-management-based motivation, 
as peers cannot observe the decision-making process in such situations.
Our findings have important implications for theory and practice. We add 
to prior research by identifying compensation interdependence as an impor-
tant determinant for risk-taking. Prior research in this field has focused on the 
effect of compensation interdependence on misreporting (Church et  al. 2012; 
Lill 2020; Maas and van Rinsum 2013) and free-riding (Holmstrom 1982), but 
it has not considered the effect on risk-taking in conventional and alternative 
workplaces. Moreover, we add to the stream of literature investigating the link 
between mutual monitoring and dysfunctional behavior (Hannan et al. 2013; Orr 
2001; Towry 2003). Finally, we add to the stream of literature examining choice 
shifts in groups by separating the effect of a particular characteristic of decision-
making in groups on risk-taking, that is, compensation interdependence. We also 
inform firms that the hidden costs of using compensation interdependence depend 
on the respective working environment. In traditional workplaces, where mutual 
monitoring of decisions is often present, firms should consider that compensa-
tion interdependence influences not only performance and cooperation but also 
the risk-taking behavior of employees. Compensation interdependence, however, 
does not increase risk-taking in workplaces where mutual monitoring is absent. 
This finding also emphasizes the necessity for managers and human resource 
management to develop different compensation systems depending on the work-
ing environment. For example, if firms wish to reduce or maintain overall risk-
taking in their operations, they should be cautious when implementing interde-
pendent compensation for traditional working environments, while this approach 
is less problematic in alternative working environments like telecommuting or 
hot-desking.
Risk-taking that goes beyond the expected value-maximization of risk-neutral 
decisions can be considered a facet of suboptimal decision-making from a firm’s 
perspective. Thus, our results can potentially generalize to other types of subop-
timal decision-making beyond different risk-taking forms, in which individuals 
have an impression-management-based reason to incorporate their affected peers’ 
preferences in their decision-making process. Thereby, compensation interde-
pendence can potentially lead to inferior decision-making in other domains as 
well.
Fruitful areas of research arise from limitations of our study. First, we assume 
a linear relationship between performance and compensation. While such a linear 
compensation component is usually contained in compensation contracts by the 
incentive zone of bonus payments, total compensation is often shaped differently. 
It would be interesting to investigate the effects of compensation interdependence 
under different functional forms between performance and compensation. Especially 
in settings with option-based compensation, which is only relevant for (larger) stock 
companies, visibility of decisions might play another role. Second, while we focus 
on mutual monitoring of decisions rather than on the outcomes of these decisions to 
provide a suitable test of our hypotheses, future research could examine the influence 
of mutually monitored decision outcomes to expand the findings to other areas of 
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practical relevance. Third, we can show how risk-taking differs depending on mutual 
monitoring—however, we do not test mechanisms that potentially reduce risk-taking 
under compensation interdependence. Moreover, as telecommuting agreements are 
gaining importance, future research might further explore the effects of alternative 
control mechanisms on risk-taking when mutual monitoring is absent.
Appendix 1
See Table 4.
Table 4  Multipliers and probabilities in the investment task
Probabilities Multiplier
Investment H Investment L












Round 1 1/3 2/3 162 44 122 89
Round 2 7/15 8/15 142 32 116 86
Round 3 1/3 2/3 180 35 128 86
Round 4 1/3 2/3 150 50 116 92
Round 5 11/30 19/30 172 32 119 89
Round 6 1/3 2/3 166 42 124 88
Round 7 1/3 2/3 184 33 130 85
Round 8 13/30 17/30 140 40 117 87
Round 9 1/3 2/3 170 40 126 87
Round 10 1/3 2/3 160 45 120 90
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